Theosophy and the Study of Religion
Edited by Charles M. Stang and Jason Ananda Josephson Storm
Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2024. 364 pp., hardcover, $191.
Scholars of Western esotericism have increasingly been exploring Theosophy as a source of cultural influence. Although much of this work is uneven and characterized by a certain academic myopia, on the whole they treat Theosophy and its leading figures thoughtfully and respectfully.
The latest entry in this category is Theosophy and the Study of Religion, a collection of academic essays. Themes discussed are “Theosophy, Early Christianity, and the Question of Origins,” “Theosophy and Race,” “Theosophy and Asian Religions,” and “Theosophy and Language.”
As expected, “Theosophy and Race” is the weakest section. One could summarize its conclusions thus: “We just know that there is racism in Theosophy, although we can’t exactly put our finger on where.” Theosophical works are blamed for fueling racist discourse in the early twentieth century, although this had any number of sources and influences, of which Theosophy was far from the strongest. By this view, the central goal of the Theosophical Society—the universal brotherhood of humanity “without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste, or color”—is mere window dressing.
The section on Christianity displays a certain obliviousness, sometimes suggesting that the early Theosophists were more original than they were or claimed to be. Denise Kimber Buell’s “Modern Theosophy’s Legacy in New Testament and Early Christian Studies” says, “This formulation, ‘Christ in you,’ is crucial for theosophists,” citing Annie Besant’s Esoteric Christianity and Anna Kingsford’s Perfect Way. Buell makes it sound as if Besant and Kingsford had come up with this idea, but (as they themselves contended) it has been central to Christian mysticism from the beginning.
Similarly, in “A Theosophical History of Religions,” Olav Hammer writes, “Every religion, in Blavatsky’s view, presents an exoteric version of teachings to ordinary believers, and another, esoteric, aspect to a spiritually advanced elite”—as if she had cooked up this idea, which goes at least as far back as classical antiquity.
Probably the most astounding omission is in Charles M. Stang’s “H.P. Blavatsky and Origen of Alexandria,” a comparison of HPB’s views with those of the third-century church father. In regard to reincarnation, Stang points out, correctly, that “Origen did espouse some sort of doctrine of rebirth, as part of a grand, cosmic evolution of fallen minds on their way back to the embrace of their divine source.” But Stang fails to mention that Origen emphatically distinguished the Christian concept of resurrection from reincarnation: in fact he repeatedly denies and mocks “the foolish doctrine of reincarnation” (Contra Celsum 3.75)—a fact that is surely relevant to the discussion. Of course Blavatsky does not mention it either. No doubt Stang is right in saying that “Blavatsky’s knowledge of Origen and his writings was rather limited,” but one might have hoped for better from Stang.
Arthur Versluis’s “Theosophies and Asian Religions” discusses the connection of the theosophy of the seventeenth-century mystic Jacob Boehme with that of the Theosophical Society. Versluis cites Joscelyn Godwin’s view, expressed in his Theosophical Enlightenment, to the effect that “between Blavatskyan theosophy and its Christian offshoots and Böhmean theosophy there is virtually no continuity. Godwin is right about that,” Versluis concludes, without further explanation. One wonders why he bothered to write the article.
Two of the more valuable pieces vindicate certain claims about religious origins made by early Theosophists that were repudiated by the academics of their day. Wouter Hanegraaff discusses G.R.S. Mead’s contention in Thrice-Greatest Hermes that the Corpus Hermeticum reflected a genuine Egyptian inspiration rather than being, as scholarly opinion of the day held, a mishmash of Greek, Jewish, and Christian ideas. Scholars have come to agree with Mead (although, as Hanegraaff indicates, without crediting him). Even so, a reader goes away astonished by the amount of academic energy that has been expended to determine that, after all, the Hermetic texts were exactly what they claimed to be: a codification of Egyptian esoteric concepts in the language of the Greeks.
Michael Gomes’ article “Max Müller, Blavatsky, and the Esoteric Buddhism Debate” discusses the fraught relationship between Blavatsky and Müller, the most admired scholar of Indian religions of the late nineteenth century. Blavatsky declared the existence of an “esoteric Buddhism” (made famous by A.P. Sinnett’s 1883 book of that title), which Müller vehemently denied. According to Gomes, time has circled round to vindicate Blavatsky: “By the beginning of the twenty-first century Esoteric Buddhism was now a fixture in the Buddhist narrative.” Gomes concludes, “How well has Müller’s verdict on esoteric Buddhism held up? . . . Not well, at all.” But Gomes does not mention that this esoteric Buddhism—chiefly the Tibetan Vajrayana—bears little resemblance to the esoteric Buddhism of Blavatsky.
Perhaps the most important passage in this collection is in Isaac Lubelsky’s “Grounding the Celestial,” which describes the process by which present-day academic consensus was hashed out in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: “In my understanding, the modern Western worldview, with its clear borders between the legitimate scientific and the non-scientific, was born out of the period described in this essay. Therefore the story of the Theosophical Society is an excellent example to this rift that ended with the creation of two rivaling fields, the theosophical one moved aside, in order to define the established scientific field and to enable its dominance. In other words, the scholar’s voice, or the historian’s voice in my case, is bound to use the same Western set of tools when interpreting the theosophical story. This voice is therefore by no means objective, and has, perhaps unfortunately, no other choice than to be critical, as long as it keeps the same scientific tendency that was born out of this struggle.”
Lubelsky’s frankness is refreshing. One wishes that other scholars in the field were more willing to admit how their views are skewed by their academic orientation. If this bias were merely a lack of emotional affinity, it might make no difference, but it often leads to mistakes and misconceptions even from a scholarly point of view. As a result, much of this literature must be read with caution and skepticism.
Richard Smoley